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Abstract: As U.S. civil rights legislation, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) was created to eliminate workplace discrimination on the basis
of disability. Using the United States as an example, this research analyzes the
potential for disability legislation to laden employers with excessive cost burdens,
specifically expenses from additional workplace injuries and illnesses. In addition,
this study looks at the likelihood that employers compensate for these costs by
cutting workplace sick leave benefits. Prior to the ADA's implementation, U.S.
employers had the fear of incurring excessive cost. The paper successfully
counters this fear by looking first at whether the legislation spawned significant
increases in the incident rates of occupational injuries and illnesses, and second,
whether employers compensated for soaring compliance costs by decreasing
paid sick leave benefits.
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Disability Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Employer Cost
Introduction
The ADA is a landmark civil rights legislation passed in the United States
"to establish a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis
ADA expected that the law would bring about a nation-wide economic revolution,
of disability" (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2000). Proponents of the
drastically increasing the employment opportunities of people with disabilities and
changing the face of the American workplace. Compelling testimony from political
representatives assured the country's citizens that the ADA would establish "a
comprehensive national mandate to eliminate discrimination against persons with
disabilities" (135 CONG. REC. 57, 1989).
When the U.S. Congress passed the ADA, it extended the essence of a
previous national mandate, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA), and its
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national
origin to disability. This extension was composed of five titles: Title I:
Employment, Title II: Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and
Local Government Services, Title III: Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability
by

Public

Accommodations

and

in

Commercial

Facilities,

Title

IV:

Telecommunications, and Title V: Miscellaneous Provisions (Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 2000). Though President George Bush signed the ADA
into law on July 26, 1990, American businesses were given grace periods to
come into compliance. Title I, the centerpiece of this research, became effective
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on July 26, 1992, for U.S. employers with 25 or more employees and for
employers with 15 or more employees on July 26, 1994.
The original intent of the ADA was to level an uneven playing field in favor
of people with disabilities. Though the enactment of the ADA raised awareness in
the States of the need for equal opportunities for persons with disabilities, the
economic effects of this law remain questionable. Employers and people with
disabilities, the two parties at the heart of the ADA, were assured that their
employment

burdens

and

financial

strains

would

lighten.

Perceived

discrepancies between Title I's goals and outcomes have led to workplace
inconsistencies, with employers arguing that the demands of the Act are too
heavy. Congress's intent was to pass a federal civil rights law that maintained its
integrity without bias from external influences such as employer prejudices.
In 1990 the U.S. Congress found that "individuals with disabilities [we]re a
discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated
to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics
that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society" (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
2000). Merriam-Webster (2001) defines stereotype as "a standardized mental
picture that is held in common by members of a group and that represents an
oversimplified opinion, prejudiced attitude, or uncritical judgment." Particularly
questionable is whether stereotypical assumptions regarding the employment of
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people with disabilities are actually true. After 10 years of passage, data exists to
dissect the reality of these assumptions.
To counter initial fears, the ADA specifically stated that an employer may
not disqualify an individual with a disability who is currently able to perform a job
because of speculation that a disability may cause a risk of future injury"
(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2000). Not unique to the United States,
employees enjoy guaranteed recovery of benefits for injuries incurred on-the-job
regardless of fault. The law forbids employers from stereotyping people with
disabilities as workers who are more likely to be injured and therefore, not
deserving of employment.

In addition, future costs that might only become

apparent after an applicant is hired are irrelevant. This study analyzes historical
data to address two stereotypical assumptions. First, this paper looks at whether
Title I sparked an increase in occupational injury and illness rates, and second,
whether employers compensated for compliance costs by decreasing the
frequencies that they offer paid sick leave benefits
Background
One of the powers given to Congress by the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution was the power to regulate interstate commerce (U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 3).

Since this time, Congress has broadly applied this power, even

regulating what appeared to be local activities, for example, prohibiting
discrimination against minorities through civil rights legislation. Like other U.S.
federal civil rights laws, the ADA was passed pursuant to Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce and extended to state entities through the
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Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). Before passing the ADA, the
U.S. Congress found ample evidence to support its conclusion that discrimination
on the basis of disability impeded interstate commerce. With the ADA, Congress
intended to:
1) Provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
2) Provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
3) Ensure that the federal government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
4) Invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce, in
order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2000).
As the legislative history of the ADA highlights, in colonial times it was
considered an American family's responsibility to care for members with
disabilities.

However, in the 1920s, with the return of World War I veterans to

the United States and an increase in industrial accidents, large numbers of
Americans with disabilities were searching for rehabilitation and work.

As a

result, Congress passed legislation that began the building blocks for the ADA.
The focus of this study is Title I of the ADA, the section of the ADA
requiring equal employment opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities.
Title I requires that individuals with disabilities be given the same consideration
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for employment that individuals without disabilities are given.

That is, an

individual who is qualified for a job cannot be denied that job because the
individual has a disability.
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in all employment practices,
including job application procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, compensation,
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. It covers
employment-related activities, such as recruitment, advertising, tenure, layoff,
leave, and fringe benefits (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2000). Title I
applies to private employers, state and local governments, employment
agencies, and labor unions. The ADA's definition of "employee" includes U.S.
citizens who work for American companies, their subsidiaries, or firms controlled
by Americans outside the United States (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 1992). However, the Act provides an exemption from coverage for
any action that violates the law of the foreign country where a workplace is
located. Given its sweeping nature, Title I has been the most embattled part of
the ADA.
Some experts feel that "as a result of the ADA the owners of commercial
enterprises bear substantial costs to accommodate [individuals with disabilities]"
(O'Quinn, 1991).

Because individuals with disabilities often need to do jobs

differently, some employers feared that excessive costs would result from people
with disabilities being injured while working.

Essentially, one stereotype of

people with disabilities is that they are more prone to accidents; some employers
feel that being forced to employ people with disabilities means more job mishaps
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and additional lost work-time. If true, employing people with disabilities likely
requires liberal sick leave policies.

To compensate for these losses, it is

reasonable to hypothesize that employers balance these losses, whether real or
perceived, by cutting associated benefits, specifically paid sick leave packages.
Employers then save money by offering limited paid benefits.
The data needed to begin analyzing the accuracy of these assumptions,
the number of occupational injuries and illnesses, is easily tracked in the United
States with workers' compensation claims. U.S. workers' compensation
programs, implemented by each of the 50 states, provide remedies to employees
injured at work. Workplace injury and illness costs have expanded faster than
any other employment-related costs. In 1984, the annual workers' compensation
costs paid by employers were an estimated thirty billion dollars (Thompson,
1993). Between 1988 and 1991, costs rose twenty-nine percent to an annual
employer payout of approximately sixty billion dollars (Thompson, 1993). U.S.
companies spend close to $200 billion a year on medical treatment,
rehabilitation, and partial wage replacement, and these costs continue to climb
every year (Mosley & Lawson, 1999).
The relationship between the ADA and on-the-job injuries and illnesses is
complicated. The simplest explanation for increased costs is that people with
disabilities are more likely to be injured at work. The ADA requires that only after
offering a job can the employer inquire into an applicant's medical history. As a
result, high-risk candidates for injuries cannot be identified during the hiring
process. The ultimate effect of this ADA rule is to limit the employer's ability to
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screen out those most likely to suffer a workers' compensation injury (Floyd,
1994).
Many U.S. studies that show employing people with disabilities is not
dangerous or expensive. A 1990 survey by DuPont revealed that in attendance,
86 percent of employees with disabilities were rated average or above (E.I.
duPont de Nemours and Company, 1996). To support this, Sears Roebuck
reported findings that the average workplace accommodation for an individual
with a disability at the company was only $45. (Blanck, 1994). The costs of an
accommodation were less than half the $121 average cost from 1978 to 1992.
Also, the Job Accommodation Network (JAN), a free consultation service of the
U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Disability Employment Policy, reported that
most accommodations cost less than $500 (Job Accommodation Network, 1999).
JAN’s data support the argument that the ADA is not costing employers
extensive amounts of money.

Essentially, there have been very few

accommodations that cost employers large amounts of money; only 18 percent
of accommodations cost over $1000 (Job Accommodation Network, 1999). If
accurate, employer fears of attendance and leave abuse are simply fallacies.
Despite the studies supporting the low cost of employing people with
disabilities, there is contradictory evidence.

For example, reports show that

businesses have been forced to spend an estimated five billion dollars to comply
with the intricacies of the ADA (Ogle, 2000).

In addition, the Washington

Business Group on Health (1998) determined that lost employee time due to
disability amounts to as much as 10 percent of payroll. These costs range from
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noticeable profit margin losses such as payroll expenses and insurance
premiums to knowledge, experience, and training. In a recent survey, thirty-three
percent of human resources professionals stated that they would eliminate
intermittent leave

entirely (Barnett,

1997).

In

addition

to

burdensome

administration, they cite the difficulty managers face following their employees'
whereabouts, staffing temporarily vacant positions, and managing reduced
productivity (Barnett, 1997).
A measure of how employers balance their costs is the amount of benefits
they offer employees. Extra costs usually mean lower profits and fewer benefits,
including sick leave days. As a result, employers may reduce these benefits to
compensate for losses.

This reduction may also help dilute any wrongful

termination claims; with a stringent attendance policy, employers often
successfully defend discrimination claims by arguing excessive absenteeism.
Disabled plaintiffs are painted as violators of nondiscriminatory sick leave
policies. Employers often successfully defend attendance-related terminations
under Title I by arguing violations of standard sick leave policies (Fram, 2000).
The relevant questions for this study are: 1) whether the ADA spawned
significant increases in the incident rates of occupational injuries and illnesses,
and 2) whether employers compensated for soaring compliance costs by
decreasing paid sick leave benefits.
Methodology
Three annual data sets were used to answer the two questions posed: 1)
data on whether Title I was implemented in the respective year, 2) data on the
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incidences of occupational injuries and illnesses, and 3) data on the frequencies
that employers offered paid sick leave benefits. Data from prior to and after the
implementation of Title I were compared. Data from the initial year that Title I
went into effect, 1992, were deleted from the samples.
First, has there been a significant increase in the number of incidence
rates of occupational injuries and illnesses with the implementation of Title I?
The two variables for this question were the binary variables (0,1) denoting
whether Title I was implemented and the corresponding time series variable
denoting the incidence rates of occupational injuries and illnesses in U.S.
workplaces.

The alternative hypothesis was that the incidence rates of

occupational injuries and illnesses increased with the implementation of Title I.
Data from 1985 to 1998 were used for analyses. The incidence rates for private
industry were compiled from the Safety and Health Statistics division of the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1999). The incidence rates
represented the number of injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time workers.
Second, with the implementation of Title I, has there been a significant
change in the number of paid sick leave benefit packages offered by U.S.
employers? The two variables for this question were the binary variables (0,1)
denoting whether Title I was implemented at the time of data collection and the
corresponding time series variable denoting the frequencies that U.S. employers
offered paid sick leave benefit packages. The alternative hypothesis was that
employers decreased the frequencies of paid sick leave packages with the
implementation of Title I. Data from 1985 to 1997 were used for the analyses.
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Annual data on the frequencies of paid sick leave packages were obtained from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, specifically the Employee Benefits Survey,
which is an annual survey of the benefits provided by employers to their
employees (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000).

Data were collected from a

sample of approximately 6000 U.S. private sector and state and local
government establishments. The data were presented as a percentage of
employees who participated in the benefit of paid sick leave.
To test the two hypotheses, initial queries focused on two tests for
normality: 1) the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test (Kolmogorov, 1941) with a
Lilliefors (1967) adjustment, and 2) the Shapiro-Wilk normality test (Shapiro &
Wilk, 1965).

Two-sample variance t-tests showed if significant differences

existed between pre Title I and post Title I data. Since preliminary modifiedLevene (1960) tests revealed that variances were unequal for the data sets, the
Aspin-Welch t-test (Aspin, 1949, & Welch, 1938) replaced the equal variance
Student's t-test (Student, 1908, & Student, 1938). Because the sample sizes
were small, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for different distributions were also
used to support the t-test results (Chakravart, Laha, & Roy, 1967). Data were
tested with SPSS Base 10.0 (2000), and all tests were interpreted based on a
critical value of α =.05.
Results and Analysis
The results do not support the alternative hypothesis that since the
implementation of Title I the incidence rates of occupational injuries and illnesses
have increased. With the exception of a small increase in 1993, incidence rates
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have declined steadily since 1990. Prior to 1990, the incidence rates climbed
approximately two percent per year, holding steady from 1985 to 1986 and from
1988 to 1989. Though there was a slight increase in incidence rates in 1993,
overall, the rates have steadily declined approximately four percent per year
since 1991 as depicted in Figure 1. The steady decrease in the incidence rates
continued after the implementation of Title I.
FIG. 1. Incidence rates of occupational injuries and illnesses (OII)
9.0

8.5

8.0

7.5

OII

7.0

6.5
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

YEAR

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1999.

There were no outliers or extreme values in the data, and the data
appeared to be normally distributed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilks
normality tests. According to the modified Levene test, the two groups had equal
variances. An Aspin-Welch t-test was 1.991 with 6.894 degrees of freedom and a
p-value of 0.087. The p-value was not small enough to reject the idea that the
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mean for the number of occupational injuries and illnesses per 100 workers prior
to the implementation of Title I and this number after its implementation were
equal. In addition, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test implied no significant difference
between the data groups. In summary, the decision tests supported the rejection
of the alternative hypothesis that the incident rates of occupational injuries and
illnesses increased with the implementation of Title I. This stereotypical
assumption was rejected.
The results also do not support the hypothesis that the benefits of paid
sick leave were decreased to compensate for ADA compliance losses. This
frequency jumped from 1985 to 1986; thereafter, the frequency steadily, though
not significantly, decreased as shown in Figure 2. This decrease persisted after
the implementation of Title I, amounting to approximately four percent per year.
There were no outliers or extreme values in the data, and the data
appeared to be normally distributed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilks
normality tests. An Aspin-Welch t-test was 3.058 with 2.185 degrees of freedom
and a p-value of 0.083. The p-value was not small enough to reject the idea that
the mean for the incidences of paid sick leave prior to the implementation of Title
I and this number after its implementation were equal.

In addition, the

Kolmogorov-Smirnov test implied no significant difference between the data
groups. In summary, the decision tests supported the rejection of the alternative
hypothesis that the frequency of paid sick leave packages decreased with the
implementation of Title I. This stereotypical assumption was rejected.
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FIG. 2. Frequency that employers offer paid sick leave benefits (PSL)
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000.

Conclusions
In general, there was no statistically significant conclusive evidence that
the number of U.S. occupational injuries and illnesses increased with the
passage of Title I. Also, there was no statistically significant conclusive evidence
that American employers decreased paid sick leave benefit offerings. If Title I led
to more people with disabilities integrating the workforce, the number of injuries
and illnesses did not reflect that they were more likely to be injured on-the-job.
Therefore, it is not rational to think that employers should fear soaring workers’
compensation costs, heightened liabilities, or outrageous medical costs.
One reason for the decline in injuries and illnesses is that a high
percentage of educated workers now take steps to prevent workplace mishaps.
Also, increased safety training by employers to lower insurance premiums is
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another possible explanation. The U.S. labor shift from high risk manufacturing
to service industries may also contribute. Increased regulation and enforcement
by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the tightening of
state workers’ compensation statutes, and the intense monitoring and follow-up
by disability insurance companies were other potential explanations.
Also, there were no indications that people with disabilities were more
likely to use sick leave or that employers compensated for perceived looses by
cutting these benefits. It is not rational to think that employees with disabilities
increased workplace costs because of excessive sick leave use. One reason for
the benefit's steadiness is that the high growth American economy forced
employers to offer competitive benefit packages to attract skilled workers. Also,
some state wage and hour laws now mandate employers to provide minimum
levels of sick leave benefits, and many contractual agreements between
employers and insurers dictate sick leave programs.
The queries explored in this study directly underscore the intricate
relationships between the two parties at the heart of Title I: employees and
employers. The push by people with disabilities to improve their stature and well
being in the United States has been directly linked to the implementation of Title
I. The results support that the levels of benefits offered by U.S. employers and
the numbers of occupational injuries and illnesses incurred at the workplace have
been unaffected by the ADA. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the
steps of providing protection to people with disabilities caused American
employers excessive burdens or reduced employee sick leave benefits.
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